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DEBATING "BEYOND HUMAN RIGHTS" SYMPOSIUM
Beyond Individual 
Criminal Responsibility?
Anne Peters’ most recent opus ‘Beyond Human Rights: The 
Legal Status of the Individual in International Law’ 
constitutes an outstanding and ground-breaking piece of 
scholarship that radically re-positions the individual within 
the grid system of international law and consistently 
supplements her previous work on global constitutionalism: 
The book hence establishes a new frame of reference for 
analysing the individual’s status under international law as – 
instead of exclusively focussing on human rights as the 
‘pivotal and completely undisputed element of the 
international legal status of the individual’ (at 27) – it 
manages to shift the focal point to those ‘low-threshold’ 
individual rights and obligations that so far have not attained 
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the status of fully-fledged human rights law. This line-up 
serves as the starting point in developing the volume’s main 
objective: to put forward a legally sound and systematized 
account of what international law has to say about the status 
of the individual in the early 21  century.
The character of international legal personality
As one of the main elements in this endeavour, Peters 
highlights the figure of international legal personality: 
According to her conception, this legal institution applies 
directly to the individual and comprises both a ‘positive’ and 
‘negative’ component, i.e. it endows the individual with 
concrete rights and imposes certain obligations. Instead of 
unduly focussing on the positive dimension, the book 
henceforth dwells on the ‘downside’ of the individual’s 
international legal capacity, namely its obligations under 
international law at both the primary (addressing its 
individual obligations) and secondary level (pertaining to 
individual international responsibility). Peters argues that it 
is particularly the latter aspect that up to now has neither 
received sufficient momentum nor attained universal 
acceptance within international legal discourses. In this 
respect, both the book in general and this facet of 
international responsibility in particular correlate with a 
sweeping debate in contemporary international law, which 
aims at deconstructing the multidimensionality of 
international responsibility and identifying mutually 
affecting streams of individual and joint action.
Taking this as the initial point, Peters engages in a doctrinal 
tour de force, during which she exposes how broad-based 
individual international responsibility could be established 
while recurring to the principle of individual criminal 
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responsibility for international crimes. This legal facility is 
thus utilized as a proxy so as to arrive at her core argument, 
namely that there is no compelling reason to restrict 
individual international responsibility to the realm of 
criminal law and that the imposition of primary obligations 
as well as their respective fulfilment would in fact be 
rendered pointless if not backed up by secondary 
responsibilities. Here, Peters rightly postulates that already 
for logical reason, it is indispensable that international legal 
capacity – perceived as the ability to bear certain obligations 
– goes hand in hand with international responsibility.
This reasoning hence constitutes both a veritable step in 
attempting to re-shape the nature of individual international 
responsibility beyond criminal law as well as to position it 
within a multidimensional conception of international 
responsibility on a broader scale. Moreover, if one is to 
accept the possibility that violations of primary duties can 
generally trigger individual responsibility directly under 
international law and therefore in the sense of non-criminal 
responsibility, this would effectively facilitate the process of 
turning the individual into a prime subject of international 
law (see also at 150). As Peters mentions en passant, the 
concrete gain to be expected from such a far-reaching 
modification, i.e. the facility to impose on individuals the 
duty (at least theoretically) to also compensate victims for 
violations of international law, however, still needs to be 
spelled out in more detail and balanced against abiding state 
responsibilities: At the end of the day, it’s not about playing 
off the individual against the state or letting states go off the 
hook entirely, but to effectively promote the role of the 
individual so as to move towards a duality of responsibility.
Beyond individual criminal responsibility (?)
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After explicating this principal sympathy, Peters finally hints 
at potential gateways from which to further expand the 
scope of individual international responsibility and to strive 
towards the just described duality of responsibility: Amongst 
several already existing linkages in contemporary 
international law, Peters most convincingly refers to the 
International Law Commission’s Draft Articles on State 
Responsibility (ASR), which postulate in Article 58 that ‘…
these articles [should be] without prejudice to any question 
of the individual responsibility under international law of any 
person acting on behalf of a State’. Although clearly geared 
towards individual responsibility in connection to an official 
capacity, Peters is right to assume that, by virtue of an 
argumentum e contrario, this does not necessarily rule out 
discrete individual international responsibility per se. This 
sympathy can be further substantiated in view of the 
commentary to Art 58 ASR, explicating that, in general, ‘…it 
is not excluded that developments may occur in the field of 
individual civil responsibility’. Based thereon, Peters 
concludes that there is no compelling reason to assume that 
the individual cannot have international responsibility in a 
broader dimension. Accordingly, the next and logical step in 
this ‘process of humanizing international law’ (at 149) would 
be to arrive at a formal, though not necessarily codified 
consolidation of individual international responsibility, 
thereby likewise emphasizing the individual’s principal rights 
and its primary as well as secondary obligations.
‘Beyond Human Rights’ is a remarkable contribution and 
deserves commendation for mainly three reasons: Firstly, for 
its bravery as Peters proposes a radical shift of perspective 
for international law and a true pivot towards the individual. 
This substantial re-configuration of reasoning about the 
human being within international law hence breaks with 
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traditional approaches and may serve as a benchmark for a 
whole new generation of upcoming scholars.
Secondly, the book strikes by virtue of its clarity: It develops 
the underlying thesis in a distinct and straightforward 
manner, thus carefully distinguishing between de lege lata
and de lege ferenda. This treatise is thus not a forced (re-)
positioning of the individual at the centre of international 
law, but an organically developed and well-reasoned 
argument, firmly rooted in contemporary international law.
Finally, ‘Beyond Human Rights’ is a subtle eulogy on the 
underlying modernizing force of international criminal law: 
Here, this still nascent realm of public international law 
serves as the nexus to reconsider individual international 
responsibility, hence transcending traditional patterns of 
legal reasoning and thereby placing the individual in the 
front seat of 21  century international law.
Raphael Oidtmann is a research fellow at the Chair for Public 
Law, International and European Law, Media Law at the 
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